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KEY MESSAGES 
 The Leveson Report on the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press 
proposed a system under which the independence and effectiveness of 
a self-regulator set up by the press could be assured through a process 
of independent “audit” or “recognition”. 
 The Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press establishes an 
independent Recognition Panel, which does not regulate the press, but 
decides whether a self-regulator meets pre-set criteria for regulatory 
independence and effectiveness. 
 The Recognition Panel is independently appointed and protected from 
political interference by the terms of the Royal Charter and by a 
statutory requirement that a two-thirds majority of both Houses of 
Parliament is required to amend that Charter. There is a “double lock” 
on political interference with the recognition system. 
 Under the system proposed by Leveson the press remains in 
operational control of its own regulation and politicians are excluded 
from any role in the process. The Recognition Panel is an auditor, not a 
regulator. 
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“the press is given significant and special rights in this country … With these 
rights, however, come responsibilities to the public interest: to respect the 
truth, to obey the law and to uphold the rights and liberties of individuals. In 
short, to honour the very principles proclaimed and articulated by the industry 
itself (and to a large degree reflected in the Editors’ Code of Practice)”. 
 
 - Sir Brian Leveson 
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The British press has long been free from state regulation. By the late nineteenth century the 
previous regimes of licensing and onerous taxation had been removed. Over the next century, 
with the exception of short periods during wartime, the press was not subject to any form of 
government backed regulation. But public concern about  the conduct of the press over the past 
60 years led to the establishment of a series of Royal Commissions and other official inquiries. 
These, in turn, resulted in the establishment of a series of largely ineffective self-regulatory 
bodies, most recently the Press Complaints Commission (PCC). 
In July 2011, following a series of revelations about “phone hacking” and other illegal practices 
at the country largest circulation newspaper, the News of the World, all political parties agreed 
to establish an inquiry into the “culture practices and ethics of the press”. This was carried out 
by a senior judge of the Court of Appeal in England and Wales, Sir Brian Leveson, who 
published his report in November 2012.   
On 18 March 2013, the main political parties agreed on the terms of a “Royal Charter on Self-
Regulation of the Press” to implement the recommendations contained in the Leveson Report.  
This was approved by the Privy Council on 30 October 2013. 
The establishment of a body which plays a role in the self-regulation of the press by a process 
as obscure and little understood as a Royal Charter has given rise to considerable confusion 
and misunderstanding, particularly among people outside of the UK. The purpose of this brief is 
to look at the background and to explain how the Charter is designed to operate and, in 
particular, how it is designed to protect the press against political interference in its regulation. 
The system of self-regulation established by the Charter implements two key innovations which 
were proposed by Sir Brian Leveson. These are a mechanism of “recognition” or audit of the 
self-regulator (or self-regulators) set up by the press themselves and a series of incentives to 
membership of the self-regulatory body enshrined in law. This brief will explain how this system 
is designed to ensure that a self-regulator is independent and effective, and where it contains 
“double lock” safeguards against government or political interference. It argues that any 
attempts to replicate the Leveson model in other countries should include such strong 
safeguards against political interference in the self-regulation of the press. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
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A History of Failure in Self-Regulation of the British Press 
There has been public concern about press standards in the United Kingdom for more than 70 
years. The British press has, throughout that period, been dominated by a small number of 
powerful proprietors – often referred to as the “press barons”. Many different civil society 
elements – including but not limited to journalists, academics and NGOs – have drawn attention 
to the concentration of media ownership, the exercise of unaccountable political power and the 
use of the press to attack and abuse individuals. The timeline below shows the major events of 
this extended struggle over press standards. 
 
Table 1: Timeline of Press Self-Regulation in the UK 
1947 A Royal Commission on Press is established to examine the finance, control, 
management and ownership of the press.  
1949 The First Royal Commission on the Press reports, finding that there had been “a 
progressive decline in the calibre of editors and in the quality of British journalism”. 
It recommends the establishment of a system of self-regulation based on a 
‘General Council of the Press’, which would promote best practice and encourage 
a spirit of responsibility, draw up a code of conduct, and have the power to receive 
and adjudicate on complaints and to impose appropriate sanctions. 
1953 The General Council of the Press was finally established, after initial rejection by 
the press, as a result of the threat of political action to establish statutory 
regulation. This Council was substantially different from that recommended. It had 
no code and no lay representation. 
1962 The Second Royal Commission on the Press reported. The General Council of the 
Press was severely criticised, particularly for not including lay members. This 
Royal Commission proposed statutory regulation unless the performance of the 
General Council improved. The Press Council was formed, including minority of 
non-press members 
1974 After continued concerns over privacy invasions and inadequate addressing of 
complaints, a Third Royal Commission on the Press, was established to “...inquire 
into the factors affecting the maintenance of the independence, diversity and 
editorial standards of newspapers and periodicals and the public freedom of choice 
of newspapers and periodicals, nationally, regionally and locally.”  
INQUIRING INTO THE PRESS  
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In the UK there is a long history of attempts to address problems of press 
behaviour and power. Each time the press has responded with a new or revised 
self-regulator that has proved inadequate.  
1977 The Third Royal Commission report was critical of the Press Council. It 
commented, 'It is unhappily certain that the council has so far failed to persuade 
the knowledgeable public that it deals satisfactorily with complaints against 
newspapers', and proposed that it should produce a written Code of Conduct for 
journalists. It again suggested a statutory solution if the response of the industry 
and Press Council was insufficient. The Press Council rejected five of the twelve 
recommendations made and ignored the recommendation for a written code of 
conduct. 
1989 Sir David Calcutt's “Inquiry into Privacy and Related Matters” was established. The 
Press Council set about reforming itself and issued its first-ever Code of Practice. 
June 1990 The Calcutt Inquiry Report concluded that existing self-regulatory arrangements for 
the press should be revised, and that the Press Council should be abolished and 
replaced with a new self-regulatory organisation: the Press Complaints 
Commission (PCC). It suggested that the press should be given “one final chance 
to prove that voluntary self-regulation can be made to work”. It set out a framework 
of measures that it regarded as the necessary elements of an effective self-
regulatory regime, and that the PCC should be given 18 months to demonstrate 
that non-statutory self-regulation could be made to work effectively. If at the end of 
that period it was demonstrated that the PCC had failed to work effectively, a 
statutory tribunal should take over the job of dealing with complaints about the 
press.   
Jan 1991 The PCC was incorporated, and set up a Code of Practice Committee against 
which editorial practice might be judged.    
Jan 1993 A Second Calcutt Report was published. It concluded that self-regulation by the 
PCC had failed and called for the introduction of a statutory Press Complaints 
Tribunal. The press rejected these conclusions but did institute some reforms of 
the PCC. 
1995 The Government responded to the second Calcutt rejecting his recommendation 
for statutory regulation. 
   
Sir Brian Leveson reviewed this history in his report and he noted that there was recurring 
concern about the “inability of self-regulation’ to address the underlying problem sufficiently” and 
distinct and enduring resistance to change from within the press. 
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The Leveson Inquiry’s Innovations 
In his Report, Sir Brian Leveson concluded that  
“The evidence placed before the Inquiry has demonstrated, beyond any doubt, that there 
have been far too many occasions over the last decade and more (itself said to have 
been better than previous decades) when these responsibilities, on which the public so 
heavily rely, have simply been ignored. There have been too many times when, chasing 
the story, parts of the press have acted as if its own code, which it wrote, simply did not 
exist. This has caused real hardship and, on occasion, wreaked havoc with the lives of 
innocent people whose rights and liberties have been disdained.” (Executive Summary, 
para 7). 
He agreed with the general assessment that the existing self-regulatory mechanisms of the 
PCC had failed. This body lacked independence from the press industry, the remedies at its 
disposal were woefully inadequate, and it had repeatedly failed to deal with major issues of 
press misconduct. 
Nevertheless, Sir Brian Leveson did not recommend statutory regulation of the press. He made 
it clear that he considered that what was needed was a “genuinely independent and effective 
system of self-regulation”. In his view this remained the best model and of vital importance for 
ensuring that there could be no government or political interference with press regulation. 
There were two central issues concerning self-regulation that the Leveson Report had to deal 
with: 
 How to ensure that a new self-regulator was independent and effective and did not suffer 
from defects of previous self-regulatory bodies. 
 How to ensure that all major publishers joined a new self-regulator. 
The solution to these problems involved two major innovations in relation to self-regulation of 
the press. Both these innovations are aimed at striking a balance between effective regulation 
and press freedom – at ensuring that the press properly regulate itself whilst remaining entirely 
free from political inference. 
The first innovation is a system of “recognition” or audit of the self-regulator (or self-regulators) 
set up by the press themselves. The Report described the process in these terms: 
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In order to meet the public concern that the organisation by the press of its regulation is 
by a body which is independent of the press, independent of Parliament and independent 
of the Government, that fulfils the legitimate requirements of such a body and can 
provide, by way of benefit to its subscribers, recognition of involvement in the 
maintenance of high standards of journalism, the law must identify those legitimate 
requirements and provide a mechanism to recognise and certify that a new body meets 
them” (Recommendation 27) 
The purpose of this recognition system is to ensure that the new body comply with certain basic 
requirements, which are set out in detail in the Report and are designed to ensure the 
independence and effectiveness of the self-regulatory body. 
The role of the recognition body is to “recognise and certify that any particular body satisfies” 
the recognition requirements. This body should not be involved in regulation of any publisher 
(Recommendation 28). 
Sir Brian Leveson suggested that the recognition body should be the existing statutory 
communications regulator, Ofcom, which regulates broadcasters, fixed line telecoms, mobiles 
and postal services. But, he recognised that this is would be controversial (because the 
Chairman and Chief Executive of Ofcom are appointed by Government ministers). As an 
alternative, he suggested that there could be a statutory “Recognition Commissioner” 
(Recommendation 31). 
The recognition body would audit a self-regulator set up by the press on the basis of a number 
of “recognition criteria”, which form Recommendations 1 to 22 and 34 to 47 of the Report. 
The Report recommends that a new independent self-regulatory body should:  
 promulgate a code of journalistic standards; 
 hear complaints against its members regarding alleged breaches of those 
standards; 
 order appropriate redress while encouraging individual newspapers to 
embrace a more rigorous process for dealing with complaints internally; 
 play an active role in promoting high standards, including having the power to 
investigate “serious or systemic breaches” and impose appropriate sanctions; 
 provide a fair, quick and inexpensive arbitration service to deal with any civil 
law claims based upon its members’ publications. 
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The new self-regulatory body would be headed by an independent Board. The Board should 
comprise a majority of individuals who are independent of the press, although it must include a 
“sufficient number of people with experience of the industry who may include former editors and 
senior or academic journalists”. It should not include any serving editor or member of the House 
of Commons or the Government. 
The regulator would include a Code Committee tasked with making recommendations on the 
content of a Code of Standards for the press. This Code Committee could include serving 
editors; however ultimate responsibility for the content and promulgation of the Code would 
reside with the Board itself.  
The Board would have the power to hear and decide on complaints about breaches of the 
standards Code by subscribers to the new body. It would have the power to impose appropriate 
remedial measures, including to:  
 direct the nature, extent and placement of apologies and corrections; 
 impose appropriate and proportionate sanctions (including financial sanctions up 
to 1% of turnover, with a maximum of £1m) on any member found to be 
responsible for serious or systemic breaches of the standards code or governance 
requirements. 
Serving editors would not be permitted to sit on any Committee advising the Board on 
complaints. Any such Committee must have a majority of people who are independent of the 
press. 
The process by which the Chair and members of the regulator are appointed must be 
independent of the press. The Report recommends that this should be achieved through the 
establishment of an independent appointments panel. The appointment panel:  
 should be appointed in an independent, fair and open way; 
 should contain a substantial majority of members who are demonstrably 
independent of the press; 
 should include at least one person with a current understanding and experience of 
the press; 
 should include no more than one current editor. 
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The recognition body only audits the self-regulator set up by any group of the press according to 
these criteria. How this system proposed by Leveson has been implemented is illustrated in the 
diagram below.  
Figure 1: The New System of Press Self-Regulation in the UK  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the author 
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Leveson also recommended incentives be set up to encourage publishers to 
participate in self-regulation. 
Under the system proposed by Leveson the press still sets up its own self-
regulator. The recognition body he suggested exists to audit whether the self-
regulator meets minimum requirements for independence and effectiveness. 
 
The second innovation was to propose that incentives to membership of the self-regulatory 
body should be enshrined in law. Sir Brian Leveson accepted that membership of an 
independent self-regulator should remain voluntary but recognised that incentives would be 
required to ensure that all significant publishers joined.  
The need for incentives “coupled with the equally important imperative of providing an improved 
route to justice for individuals”, led him to recommend, as an essential component of the system, 
an arbitration service for to civil legal claims against publishers.  
 Participation in the arbitration service would be a condition of membership of 
the new body. 
 The arbitration service should be staffed by retired judges or senior lawyers 
with specialist knowledge of media law. 
 Arbitrations would operate on an inquisitorial model, and the process would be 
free for complainants to use. Frivolous or vexatious claims would be struck out 
at an early stage.  
If a publisher does not subscribe to the new self-regulator and, as a result, does not offer free 
arbitration to claimants, then the courts could deprive the publisher of its costs in any 
reasonably arguable legal claim against it, even if the publisher is successful in that litigation. 
This Policy Brief is centrally concerned with the first of these innovations: Sir Brian Leveson’s 
proposal for a system of “audit or recognition”. It this which led, as a result of events dealt with 
in the next section, to the establishment of a Recognition Panel set up by a Charter. 
 
 
 
  
 
14 
 
 
As already discussed, a key innovation of the Leveson proposals for a new system of press 
self-regulation was the proposed establishment of a “recognition process”, underpinned by a 
statutory framework setting out “recognition requirements”. This required legislation to establish 
a recognition body, set out how it is appointed, the “recognition requirements”, and to provide 
the “incentives” for membership that Sir Brian Leveson had recommended.     
 
Why a Royal Charter? 
The form of self-regulation envisaged in the United Kingdom does not depend on there being a 
Royal Charter. Sir Brian Leveson did not recommend the use of this kind of legal structure, but 
that the self-regulator set up by the press should be “audited” by Ofcom (the body which 
regulates broadcasters) or by a statutory independent recognition commissioner. This 
recommendation was not accepted and, instead of using statute, a Royal Charter was proposed 
to provide further comfort to the press. 
Leveson’s recommendations for self-regulation of the press were welcomed by the leaders of all 
the major political parties in the United Kingdom. But there were two important caveats. 
 
Firstly, there was an apparent consensus among all three main political party leaders that 
Ofcom was not an appropriate body to act as the recognition body. 
 
Secondly, the Prime Minister David Cameron MP told Parliament on the day of the publication 
of the Leveson Report that he had “serious concerns and misgivings” in principle to any 
statutory scheme for the regulation of the press. He said “It would mean for the first time we 
have crossed the Rubicon of writing elements of press regulation into law of the land”. This view 
reflected concerns expressed by Conservative peers, Lords Black and Hunt who were acting as 
the spokesmen for the press. The view was, however, not shared by the Liberal Democrat and 
Labour Parties.  
 
Although many commentators pointed out that “elements of press regulation” were already 
contained in various statutes, Conservative ministers suggested an approach in which the 
recognition body did not have a statutory foundation. 
THE ROYAL CHARTER FOR THE PRESS 
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The proposal was to have a Royal Charter on the self-regulation of the press. The inspiration for 
this was the arrangement relating to the United Kingdom’s long established public service 
broadcaster, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which was incorporated under its first 
Royal Charter in 1926. This has been regarded by many as having helped to ensure its 
independence from Government.  
 
The use of a Royal Charter to provide the framework for self-regulation of the press was 
criticised by many supporters of the Leveson Report as an arcane and unjustified departure 
from the recommendations that had been made.   
 
This approach was, however, supported by the Conservative Party and by the press. Between 
December 2012 and February 2013, there were extensive private negotiations between 
Conservative ministers and the press leading to the publication of a draft Charter on 12 
February 2013. This draft Charter was criticised as being a “surrender to press pressure” and 
modification of Leveson’s recommendations so that a self-regulator that lacked independence 
and effectiveness could be recognised. 
 
Further talks between the main political parties, and consultations with the press and the 
campaigning group Hacked Off (representing victims of press abuse), resulted in a “Cross Party” 
Charter being agreed by the leaders of the three main political parties that was placed before 
and formally approved by the House of Commons on 18 March 2013. This was supported by 
two sets of statutory provisions: 
 
 Sections 34 to 42 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 which concern costs and exemplary 
damages relating to “relevant publishers” (the subject of a complex definition designed to 
exclude small bloggers and news website). This meant that relevant publishers who were 
not members of approved regulators faced adverse costs awards (whether they won or 
lost) and, reciprocally, that members of an approved regulator would be immune from 
adverse costs orders and exemplary damages. These provisions would only apply if a 
regulator had been recognised by a body established by Royal Charter. 
 
 Section 96 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 which deals with the 
amendment of Royal Charters and which will be considered below. 
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The use of a Royal Charter was a compromise reached among politicians between 
the Leveson recommendation for statutory underpinning for a new self-regulator 
and the Conservative leader’s insistence that there not be a statutory recognition 
scheme.  
On 25 April 2013 the Press Standards Board of Finance (PressBof), on behalf of the industry, 
published its own Charter, substantially in the terms of the version agreed between the press 
and Conservative ministers in February 2013. This was submitted to the Privy Council on 30 
April 2013. 
 
There was then a long process of consultation on the PressBof Charter that was, eventually, 
rejected by a Privy Council Committee as being inconsistent with the Leveson 
recommendations. On 11 October 2013, the final draft of the Charter was published. On 30 
October 2013, PressBof unsuccessfully applied for a last minute injunction to restrain the 
consideration of the Charter and, on the same day, the Privy Council finally granted the Royal 
Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press.  
 
 
What is a Royal Charter? 
 
It is important to understand the legal nature and effect of a Royal Charter, which, despite its 
name, has only a formal connection to the Queen, who has no decision making power in 
relation to the granting or operation of such charters. 
 
A Royal Charter is a document that incorporates a body known as a “chartered corporation”. It 
is a way of turning a collection of individuals into a single legal entity. Until 1844 this was the 
only way of establishing a company in English law and was used for trading corporations.  
Universities and professional bodies were also granted Royal Charters. Over 1000 such 
Charters have been granted since the Middle Ages, the oldest being those granted to the 
Universities of Cambridge (1231) and Oxford (1248). 
 
After the enactment of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 ordinary trading companies were 
established under a statutory mechanism. Royal Charters came to be largely reserved for the 
incorporation of eminent professional bodies, charities and educational institutions. They are, 
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A Royal Charter is an ancient and uniquely British instrument for creating 
corporations. It is not a model for other national contexts.  
however, from time to time used for the creation of corporations that are established by the 
Government but are independent of it. The BBC is one example of this.  
 
Royal Charters are granted by the Privy Council. This is a body set up under the “Royal 
Prerogative”. It is not a deliberative body. Its meetings are short and formal – lasting only for a 
few minutes with everyone remaining standing. Its members are the Queen and several 
hundred distinguished politicians, judges and others - although only three or four members (who 
are current government ministers) attend meetings, along with the Queen or her representative. 
 
By convention, the “Queen in Council” always follows the advice of her ministers. In other words, 
the Privy Council is, in substance (although not in form) a sub-committee of the Cabinet. It 
executes the orders of Government ministers. 
 
It is unclear whether and to what extent the Privy Council (that is, Government ministers) is 
entitled to interfere with the day-to-day operation of a chartered corporation or with the terms of 
its Charter. There are no clear legal rules governing the position.   
 
For this reason, and bearing in mind the general acceptance that Government ministers should 
have no role in the regulation of the press, special provision was made in relation to the Royal 
Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press to prevent political interference.  
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The opposition of some Government Ministers and the press to statutory underpinning for the 
recognition mechanism recommended by Sir Brian Leveson derived, in part, from concern that, 
in the future, politicians might seek to amend the statute to place more stringent restrictions on 
the press. At first sight, a Charter did not solve this problem because it is granted and controlled 
by the Privy Council, which is, in substance, a sub-committee of the Cabinet and is under the 
control of the Government. Much of the initial opposition the Charter proposal was based on 
concerns that in future Government Ministers might, at the behest of the press, amend the 
Charter to relax the requirements for press regulation. 
 
Independence of the Recognition Panel 
 
In order to minimise the risk of political interference with the Recognition Panel constituted by 
the Charter, two protections were put in place. There is a “double lock” on political interference:  
 
First, there are provisions written into the Charter itself concerning its amendment. Article 9 
provides that the Charter can only be “added to, supplemented, varied or omitted” if: 
 the proposed change is ratified by a unanimous resolution of all members of the board of 
the Recognition Panel; 
 a draft of the amendment is approved by a resolution of both Houses of Parliament with 
at least two thirds of members voting in support. 
 
This means that neither the Government nor Parliament can change the Charter without the 
approval of the members of the Recognition Panel. 
 
Secondly, as already mentioned, there is Section 96 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Act 2013, which provides that: 
 
“Where a body is established by Royal Charter after 1 March 2013 with functions relating 
to the carrying on of an industry, no recommendation may be made to Her Majesty in 
Council to amend the body’s Charter or dissolve the body unless any requirements 
included in the Charter on the date it is granted for Parliament to approve the 
amendment or dissolution have been met.” 
ENSURING INDEPENDENCE OF THE PRESS 
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This gives statutory effect to the restriction on amendment in Article 9 of the Charter and puts in 
place the “double lock” on political interference. Although it is expressed in general terms, it in 
fact applies only to the Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press – this is the only Charter 
establishing a body after 1 March 2013 “with functions relating to the carrying on of an industry”. 
 
The provisions of Article 9 of the Charter and section 96 of the Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act can, of course, be overridden by a new, later, statute – passed by a simple majority 
of both Houses of Parliament. This is an unavoidable consequence of the United Kingdom’s 
constitutional principle of “sovereignty of Parliament”. As a result of this principle, no Parliament 
can bind itself or its successors.   
 
However, what these provisions mean is that a new statute dealing with amendment of the 
Charter would have to be proposed. This would be, politically, very difficult for any Government 
without a broad civil society and political consensus in favour. It is most unlikely that any 
Government would, in fact, choose to put forward such a statute without this consensus and 
very unlikely it would achieve a parliamentary majority. 
 
But, most importantly, such a statute would have no direct impact on the regulation of the press.  
This is because the Charter does not deal directly with regulation, but only with recognition of a 
regulator. In the unlikely event that a future Government wanted to restrict the freedom of the 
press – and had the support of a majority in both Houses of Parliament – then this could be 
done directly by a new statute. Interfering with the recognition process under the Charter would 
not restrict the freedom of the press it would simply alter the characteristics that a self-regulator 
needed to be recognised.   
 
If a Government made the recognition criteria more draconian – by, for example, requiring a 
recognised self-regulator to have a power of pre-publication censorship – this would not be 
effective to restrict press freedom. This is because the press’ self-regulator could simply refuse 
to comply with the new recognition criteria. This would mean that when its position was 
reviewed under the Charter (two years after first recognition and then every three years) it 
would cease to be recognised but no new draconian rules would have been imposed on the 
press.   
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Changes to the Recognition Panel can only be done with its agreement and a two-
thirds majority in the Parliament, which provides significant protection from 
political influence over the Panel. 
In short, the Charter has an effective mechanism for protecting itself against change by 
politicians that is not agreed by the Recognition Panel. The operation of the recognised self-
regulator is protected not just against interference by politicians, but also against interference by 
the Recognition Panel in its day-to-day regulatory activities.   
 
 
Independence of the Self-Regulator 
 
To recap, the way in which the Leveson Report sought to preserve self-regulation whilst 
ensuring its independence and effectiveness was by a system of “audit” or “recognition”. Sir 
Brian Leveson recommended that this mechanism be underpinned by statute. However, as a 
result of press resistance to statute, it was decided that a non-statutory mechanism would be 
devised, using a Royal Charter (building on the example of the BBC). 
 
The Royal Charter on the Self-Regulation of the Press contains a set of provisions designed to 
ensure that a self-regulator is both effective and independent from outside interference, whether 
from the regulated publishers or from politicians. 
 
This guarantee of the independence of the self-regulator is in two stages. 
 
Firstly, the Recognition Panel itself is independently appointed. The Board of the Recognition 
Panel is appointed not by a Government minister but by an independent “Appointments 
Committee” appointed by the Commissioner for Public Appointments (an official independent of 
the Government). The members of the Board of the recognition panel must have “senior level 
experiences in a public, private or voluntary sector organisation” and an “understanding of the 
context with which the Regulator will operate”. Editors, former editors and current publishers are 
excluded, as are all current members of the national and devolved legislature and all 
Government ministers.   
 
Secondly, in its auditing of a self-regulator, the Recognition Panel applies a “Scheme of 
Recognition” which is set out in the Charter. Under this scheme, a self-regulator can only be 
recognised if it, itself, has an independent board, “appointed in a genuinely open, transparent 
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The Recognition Panel is independently appointed and has to use clear criteria 
when deciding whether to recognise a self-regulator, including ones aimed at 
ensuring its independence from politicians and the press industry. 
and independent way, without any influence from industry or Government”. The Chair and 
members of the Board are to be appointed by an independent appointment panel. The Board 
should comprise a majority of people who are independent of the press, but no serving editor, 
national politician or minister. 
 
In addition to these “recognition criteria”, the Charter lays down a number of other features that 
a recognised self-regulator must have, including the following: 
 
 a standards code – the responsibility of the board but drawn up by a committee that can 
included serving editors – that must take into account the importance of freedom of 
speech, the public interest and the protection of sources and must cover standards of 
conduct, respect for privacy and accuracy; 
 a “whistleblowing hotline” for journalists; 
 an adequate and speedy complaints handling mechanism; 
 a simple and credible investigations power with the power to impose appropriate and 
proportionate sanctions, including financial sanctions limited to 1% of turnover, with a 
maximum of £1 million; 
 the power to require the publication of corrections or apologies and, if necessary, their 
size and prominence; and, 
 an arbitral process for civil legal claims against members of a recognised regulator that is 
free for complainants to use and is, overall, inexpensive. 
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The Leveson reforms have created a new framework for press accountability and a series of 
new protections for press independence for the UK. These are designed to ensure independent 
and effective self-regulation of the press whilst protecting the self-regulator from political 
interference. Central to this balance is a system of “recognition” or “audit”. Leveson 
recommended that this be done by the existing broadcasting regulator, Ofcom, under statutory 
powers, but to meet press concerns about potential political interference and the use of statute 
the recognition body was constituted by Royal Charter. This established a “recognition panel” in 
which politicians can have no role. The rules governing recognition can only be amended with 
the agreement of the Panel and two-thirds majorities in each House of Parliament. As a result, 
the Charter puts in place a system that ensures effective self-regulation whilst fully protecting 
press freedom.  
 
Leveson’s recommendations came after more than half a century of press self-regulation failing 
to adequately protect the privacy of individuals and to encourage and promote ethical and 
responsible journalism. This system of press regulation contains constitutional elements 
peculiar to the UK and is implemented against a background of established legal protection of 
freedom of expression. The Royal Charter was used specifically to avoid the kind of statutory 
press regulation that the British publishers feared and contains a number of clear and specific 
safeguards against government or political interference in the press. Any attempts to replicate 
the Leveson model in other countries should include such strong safeguards against political 
interference or influence over the self-regulation of the press. 
  
 
The new UK system of press regulation is designed to ensure that a 
self-regulator is independent and effective. It also enshrines in law a 
series of protections to protect the self-regulator from direct or indirect 
interference by politicians. 
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